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ABSTRACT 
Although state government officials have direct power over certain issues like fiscal policy, 
legislatures and governors can be held accountable for conditions largely outside their control, 
such as unemployment at the state and national levels. To compound this effect, national 
fiscal policy and economic conditions have been volatile and highly publicized in recent 
years, with little research to discover how much these conditions affect elections at the state 
level.  This study finds that although national fiscal policy and economic conditions are highly 
visible, voters often only hold state representatives accountable for conditions within their 
control:  state fiscal policy decisions.  Furthermore, governors are held more accountable than 
legislators for fiscal policy decisions, while legislatures avoid direct scrutiny and are only 
affected by partisan association with presidential and gubernatorial representatives.  
Interestingly, while governors are punished for increasing the size of government, they are 
rewarded independently for revenue and expenditure increases as well as budget 
mismanagement.  This implies that while voters allocate accountability for fiscal policy 
conditions to state representatives, voter desire for government program and benefit 
sustainment outweighs the conventional desire for prudent budget management.  Finally, it is 
observed that while voters desire lavish spending at the state level, they expect more fiscal 
prudence from federal budget decisions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, fiscal sustainability (or lack thereof) has become a major topic of discussion 
in the national political sphere.  Many believe that fiscal policy has fallen out of the realm of 
sustainability at the national, state, and local levels of government.  The federal debt clock, 
complete with the share of debt for each American’s family, has become a national icon as 
debt levels surge higher each year.  As the public becomes more interested in the astronomical 
numbers presented in media sources, politicians scramble to craft the debt into a driving force 
for opposing policy actions.  Presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2012 were dominated by 
discussions of whether increased revenues or decreased expenditures were the cure for federal 
budget deficits.  Landmark political events of varying substance such as the debt ceiling 
increases, the “fiscal cliff”, sequestration measures, and the temporary government shutdown 
captivated American citizens with the issue of managing national debt that had at last 
outpaced gross domestic product.  This issue persists as a main talking point between 
politicians, political analysts, and economists and therefore in the mainstream media.   
This attention may be dramatized but it is not unwarranted.  Over the past three decades, 
annual national expenditures have more than quintupled, while revenues have failed to keep 
pace.  This has resulted in continuous deficits that have pooled to create a record historic level 
of national debt in 2013.  With large government “entitlement” programs such as Medicare 
and Social Security acting as the driving force behind spending increases, prospects for 
resolution are even more dire.  As citizens live longer and collect more benefits, additional 
strain is put on the nation’s budget.  However, despite voter attention to the debt and 
economy, the federal government has only recorded one budget surplus in the past forty years.  
Without policy action, these trends are destined to continue, and the consequences of 
insolvency may force more drastic debt reduction alternatives over the long term.   
This situation may seem surprising given conventional wisdom and research which states that 
American citizens dislike the presence of “big government” (Lowry et al., 1998).  From this, 
we should expect that voters would punish public officials who preside over large increases in 
expenditures and revenues.  This effect should be compounded, as fiscal policy is within the 
direct control of elected officials, where matters like unemployment are not.  Since officials 
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are clearly responsible for taxation and spending levels, one would thus expect that 
accountability would be placed squarely on their shoulders for budget mismanagement.  
Surprisingly, given the clear control and accountability for fiscal policy decisions, the 
progression of poor budget management has continued.   
Although the unsustainability of national fiscal policy has been discussed at length in recent 
years, state fiscal policy has followed the same trend that has existed in the national 
government.  Fiscal policy is also dictated in the same manner as the federal budget, the 
governor (executive) presents a budget proposal to the legislature, who then chooses whether 
or not to approve it. Therefore, we should assume that if voters decry budget mismanagement 
and big government at the national level, this notion should also apply to fiscal policy at the 
state level.  However, the incredible amount of media attention allocated to federal 
government actions in recent years may overshadow the policy decisions of public officials at 
the state level.   
This paper will analyze the electoral accountability of United States governors and state 
legislatures by investigating the impact of state and national fiscal policy on state election 
results.  The literature that addresses fiscal policy’s effect on state electoral accountability is 
remarkably sparse, and is especially lacking for legislative elections.  Additionally, most 
studies which examine these relationships were performed in the 1990s and primarily draw 
upon data from before that decade.  The research presented in these studies show that 
although state fiscal policy was found to have an impact on election results, national 
economic conditions and national government approval were still dominating forces in state 
elections.  Furthermore, previous research on fiscal policy and electoral accountability 
revolved more around state ideology and partisan affiliation as compared to objective 
policymaking.   
Cummins and Holyoke (2011) performed research to determine the impact of state fiscal 
policy factors on state electoral accountability.  My research seeks to build on their findings 
by using an extensive historical data range and examining the effect that national fiscal policy 
and economic conditions have on state elections.  In particular, I make contributions to the 
literature by addressing three core questions.  The first  involves researching whether national 
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fiscal conditions have a significant effect on elections for state officials, while simultaneously 
seeking to replicate and expand Cummins and Holyoke’s (2011) model which indicated that 
state fiscal policy did indeed impact voter decisions on state election day.  The second 
involves observing which branch of government, governor or legislature, is held more 
accountable for certain fiscal policy conditions, both federal and state.  Finally, I seek to 
observe the role that partisanship and accountability factors play in voter decisions, such as 
when one party controls both the governor’s mansion and the legislature or when an 
individual incumbent is running for reelection.   
To anticipate my results, I find that state fiscal conditions has an effect on state  elections 
while national fiscal conditions were only significant when the president was of the same 
party as state representatives.  Second, governors were held responsible for state fiscal policy 
while state legislatures avoided all judgment for fiscal conditions.  Finally, partisanship is 
found to play a significant role in constituent judgment of state representatives:  Democrats 
are punished for loose fiscal policy while Republicans are not.  Also, unified government at 
the state and national level is found to allow voters to hold officials more accountable for their 
actions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been extensive research done on gubernatorial elections, but little done to explain 
the results of state legislative elections.  Many of the studies during the 1980s and 1990s 
focused on whether national or state economic conditions were more influential on 
gubernatorial elections.   Spanning multiple decades, these studies were in agreement on a 
few trends, but often had differing opinions on whether state or national economic conditions 
were more important to constituents in state elections.  A predominant theme, however, was 
that economic conditions were considered very important to voters in state gubernatorial 
elections.   
During the 1980s, national economic conditions and perceived performance of the president 
were foundto be the prevailing factor over the outcome of gubernatorial elections.  Studies 
showed that national economic action was the dominant force, making the state economy of 
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little significance in elections for governor (Jewell and Olson, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 
1992).  As state economic conditions mattered little to these voters, research claimed that the 
governors had little chance of making a significant impact on their constituents’ voting 
decisions through policy-making (Kone and Winters, 1993).  This is seen as a boon for 
governors by Peltzman (1992), who claims constituents blame the President, the Federal 
Reserve and Congress for economic conditions.  Peltzman (1992) claims that economists 
would praise voters for their upward accountability, as these national figures have a much 
greater impact on the economic conditions than state governors or legislatures.   
However, this federal/national focus was largely rebutted in the mid to late 1990s, with 
researchers claiming that state economic conditions were of resurgent importance to voters.  
Niemi et al. (1995) find results challenging the previous research, reporting that state 
economic conditions have a significant effect on gubernatorial voting.  Lowry et al. (1998) 
come to similar conclusions, showing that exit polls from gubernatorial elections highlight 
dominant voter interest in state over national economic issues.  Similarly, Svodoba (1995) 
states that both gubernatorial and presidential handling of state and national economies are 
significant in gubernatorial election results.  With the renewed focus on state elections came 
increased scrutiny and accountability for the governors (and their parties) presiding over poor 
state economies (Lowry et al., 1998; Svodoba, 1995; Niemi et al., 1995; Leydon and Borrelli, 
1995).   
This enhanced focus on state economic conditions in state elections during more updated and 
contemporary studies is warranted.  Hansen (1999) states that the renewed focus on state 
economies and state governors is due to the new authority that state governors have recently 
attained and the visibility that comes with it.  Similarly to state government size, the power of 
the governor has been growing; the governor’s presence is now felt in many areas of state 
matters, including the bureaucracy, legislature and other influential groups (Hansen, 1999).  
This power enhancement comes at a time of increased visibility, with gubernatorial elections 
being switched to mid-term elections which reduced coattail effects from presidential 
elections (Hansen, 1999).  This has greatly influenced the importance, recognition, and 
accountability of the governor. 
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While gubernatorial elections are becoming more independent from national conditions, the 
importance of the president and his party affiliation still looms.  Atkesin and Perkins (1995) 
find that governors of the presidential party suffer far worse than governors of the opposing 
party.  Svodoba (1995) find that voters hold the president accountable for economic 
conditions, but will punish governors of the president’s party for poor economic conditions.   
This emergence of party affiliation is very important in determining accountability for 
economic conditions.  Aside from governors being affected by presidents from similar parties, 
the existence of unified or divided government plays a large role in voters’ perceptions of 
accountability.  If a government (houses of state legislature and governor) is divided, it is 
much more difficult to allocate blame for economic or fiscal conditions within the state 
(Lowry et al., 1998).  However, if the government is unified under one party, both governors 
and legislators are judged much more harshly for economic mismanagement because the 
blame is now easy to place onto one party (Lowry et al., 1998; Cummins and Holyoke 2011).   
There is a lack of literature focused upon legislative accountability.  Relatively few studies 
have been conducted upon this topic, and those that have been done have limited their scope 
to analyzing the Democratic party seats (Lowry et al., 1998; Chubb, 1988).  The research that 
involves state legislative accountability states that legislators are punished far less harshly 
than governors, due to their ability to avoid concentrated scrutiny (Chubb 1988).  Only in 
certain cases were legislators punished for economic conditions.  For example, in findings by 
Lowry et al. (1998), only legislators (not governors) are punished for budget mismanagement.  
However, Cummins and Holyoke (2011) states that legislators escape almost all scrutiny for 
budget imbalances, and are only accountable for increases in government size under periods 
of unified government.   
It is imperative to note the difference between economic conditions and fiscal management.  
While economic conditions such as unemployment are largely out of the control of state 
government, fiscal management is controlled completely by the governor and the state 
legislature.  However, as previously stated, studies have found that the blame for economic 
conditions outside of the state’s control is still placed on state leadership.  Fiscal management 
is also held high in the eyes of the electorate, a trend emblazoned on recent presidential 
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contender Mitt Romney’s campaign trail, as well as the topic of discussion regarding the 
recent “fiscal cliff” scenario and sequestration in the current national media forefront.  To test 
whether or not the governor and legislature were actually held accountable for things within 
their control, studies were conducted based upon voter responses to fiscal management 
(Peltzman, 1992; Lowry et al., 1998; Cummins and Holyoke, 2011).   
Focus on state fiscal management was a relatively new concept of study prior to the 1990s.  
Even now, the literature regarding constituent reactions to state budget management is sparse.  
This attention to state fiscal management was first researched by Peltzman (1992), who stated 
that voters responded adversely to government spending increases at both the state and federal 
level.  Peltzman (1992) claims voters’ opinions on fiscal matters are very different based on 
partisanship.  Peltzman (1992) showed that governors are punished for larger government and 
more state spending, but that Democrats are judged less harshly than Republicans.  In 
contrast, Lowry et al. (1998) find results that counter this, stating that Democrats are rewarded 
for more state spending while Republicans are punished.  In addition, they found that 
governors were held accountable only for the size of government while state legislators were 
blamed for budget mismanagement.  This finding is interesting, as the roles of both the 
governor and the legislature have equal responsibility for government size and budget 
imbalance.    
Recently, Cummins and Holyoke (2011) contributes to the literature on state fiscal 
management by adding an effective fiscal health measure to proxy for state deficits (which 
states, contrary to the federal government, are not legally allowed to run).  They find that 
constituents punish governors who increase the size of “big government”, but reward 
governors who increase revenue and expenditures.  This paradoxically implies that 
constituents want to maintain state benefits, but do not want to have to pay for the state 
benefits that others receive.  However, they find that state legislatures avoid punishments and 
rewards for optimal and poor fiscal conditions, only suffering from bigger government size 
during periods of unified government.  This is interesting, as one is left to wonder whether 
legislators are being punished for the increased government size on their own account, or 
simply because the governor is also being punished.   
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The recent literature regarding fiscal mismanagement and election results, however, does not 
take into account national budget management conditions.   This is where my research will 
come into play, analyzing the effect of national and state fiscal policy on gubernatorial and 
legislative electoral accountability.   
HYPOTHESES AND EXPECTATIONS 
Given both conventional wisdom and the literature, the following hypotheses are made 
regarding my core research questions: 
1. Do national fiscal policy and state fiscal policy have an effect on elections for state 
officials?   
According to recent studies by Cummins and Holyoke (2011), Lowry et al. (1998), and 
Peltzman (1992), state fiscal policy outcomes are expected to have a significant effect on 
gubernatorial accountability.  Although each study reveals that different conditions affect 
electoral punishment and reward, all come to consensus that fiscal policy does indeed have 
some degree of influence on the election results of governors.  As far as legislative elections 
are concerned, state fiscal policy conditions are less certain.  However, the few studies that 
have been done indicate that fiscal policy outcomes should affect legislative elections under 
certain conditions (Cummins and Holyoke, 2011; Lowry et al., 1998).  Thus, I expect fiscal 
policy to have an effect on gubernatorial electoral accountability, but only under certain 
political conditions in legislative elections.   
When addressing fiscal policy influence on state electoral accountability, the literature 
suggests that the focus has trended more towards state fiscal and economic conditions.  
However, in the past decade, national fiscal policy decisions have become far more prevalent 
in the political sphere, which may influence voter’s choices in gubernatorial elections.  
Additionally, state legislative elections have been observed to fall more in line with national 
economic conditions.  Building on this theory, I expect national fiscal conditions to have a 
significant effect on state legislative elections, but not on gubernatorial elections.   
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2. Which branch of government is held more accountable for certain state and federal 
fiscal policy conditions? 
Focusing on gubernatorial elections and state conditions, the only fact that the three studies 
agree on is that voters punish governors for increases in government size (Cummins and 
Holyoke, 2011; Lowry et al., 1998; Peltzman, 1992).  While Peltzman (1992) and Lowry et al. 
(1998) find that partisanship plays a huge role in how harshly governors are held accountable 
for their fiscal policy actions, Cummins and Holyoke (2011) discover that governors are 
rewarded and punished for the same fiscal policy actions regardless of party affiliation.  
Despite this disparity, I feel that the similarity of my data range to Cummins and Holyoke 
(2011) will result in similar state findings to their study; I feel that increased vote shares will 
be granted to governors who increase revenues and expenditures, but decreased vote shares 
will be given to those who increase the size of government too quickly.  For federal fiscal 
conditions, I expect governors only to be punished for growth in government size and budget 
mismanagement (fiscal health) when they are from the same party as the reigning president.   
Due to the sparse collection of fiscal policy research concerning state legislative elections, the 
results are more speculative.  According to Lowry et al. (1998) and Cummins et al. (2011), 
legislatures avoid accountability for almost all fiscal conditions, despite their clear 
responsibility for fiscal policy.  Lowry et al. (1998) noted that legislatures are only punished 
for budget mismanagement, but are not accountable for any other fiscal policy outcomes.  
Similarly, Cummins and Holyoke (2011) determine that legislative elections are only affected 
in extreme cases; legislators are punished only for presiding over increases in government size 
when the same party controls the legislature and the governor’s mansion.  This is because 
voters find it easier to punish state elected officials when they have complete control of 
government.   
However, the literature determines that legislative elections can be seen as referendums on the 
approval of the federal government (Chubb 1988).  This implies that fiscal mismanagement 
and growth in the federal government may lead to punishment of incumbent state legislatures, 
especially if they are of the same party as the president.  Thus, I expect that while state 
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legislators will likely avoid most of the blame for state fiscal conditions, they will be punished 
significantly for unsustainable fiscal policy at the national level.    
3. What role does partisanship and unified government play in voter decisions when 
considering fiscal policy outcomes? 
According to the literature, the incumbent government is held accountable in different ways 
depending on which party they are affiliated with.  For example, researchers found that 
Republicans were judged more harshly for lavish spending and growth in government size 
(Lowry et al., 1998; Peltzman, 1992).  Additionally, research shows that legislators and 
governors are punished more severely in cases of unified government, where the governor’s 
mansion and the state legislature is controlled by the same party (Cummins et al., 2011; 
Lowry et al., 1998).   Finally, in situations when the president’s party match the party of 
governors and legislatures, I anticipate national fiscal policy to have an effect on state 
electoral accountability.  Thus, I expect unified government to allow for more electoral 
punishment for governors and legislators, and for Republicans to be punished more harshly 
for growth in government size and revenue growth than Democrats.   
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To test these hypotheses, data for state fiscal and electoral outcomes from 49 U.S. states were 
gathered from 1980-2009.  This data range expands on the 1990-2009 range used by 
Cummins and Holyoke (2011) by including the 1980s era in which state governments were 
growing in size and influence.  As the 1990s continued the era of state government growth, 
and the 2000s exhibited a return to more conservative fiscal policy, this time span presents an 
array of fiscal conditions to examine.  At the federal level, fiscal policy was turbulent during 
these decades.  During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s fiscal policy slowed tax growth, but 
increased government spending, creating large deficits.   In the 1990s, government growth 
rates stabilized and tax revenues increased to create budget surpluses before the 2000s 
brought back tax reductions and expenditure increases to create deficits similar to the 1980s.  
Thus, the timeline of this data range depicts a variety of fiscal conditions in which to test my 
research questions.   
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 To determine electoral accountability for governors and legislators, election outcomes 
from these states are used.  Two separate models will be run to examine the relationship 
between fiscal policy and state electoral accountability: one for gubernatorial elections and 
one for legislative elections.  Due to data constraints, the gubernatorial model uses 
information from 48 states and the legislative model utilizes data from 44 states.  I employ the 
Ordinary Least Squares method in both models to estimate the effect of the fiscal variables on 
vote shares for state legislatures and governors.  In gubernatorial races, the incumbent party’s 
share of the vote is the dependent variable, a measure which is consistent with the literature 
(Cummins and Holyoke, 2011; Peltzman, 1992).  This variable allows for the effects of an 
incumbent’s fiscal policy to affect future elections even if the individual incumbent chooses 
not to run for reelection.  For legislative elections, the presiding majority party’s share of the 
vote in the lower house of the legislature is used.  This measure is used in Cummins and 
Holyoke (2011) to accurately examine legislative electoral accountability under Republican 
and Democratic control.  Focusing on the lower house of legislature, where most 
representatives serve 2-year terms, allows for the electorate to quickly hold representatives 
accountable for their fiscal policy decisions.  Additionally, because all members of lower 
houses are up for reelection at one time, as opposed to upper houses which have staggered 
elections, it permits voters to exercise judgment on the entirety of the legislative body.  Thus, 
only the 44 states with 2-year terms for representatives in the lower house of the state 
legislature are utilized for this model.   
 Fiscal policy is measured using four primary independent variables:  revenue growth, 
expenditure growth, government size, and fiscal health.  To examine electoral accountability 
for growth in revenues and expenditures, changes in the real state general fund expenditures 
and revenues from the previous election are used (Cummins and Holyoke, 2011; Lowry et al., 
1998; Peltzman, 1987).  This captures the entire duration of a representative’s term, often 4 
years for governors and 2 years for legislators.  To proxy for government size, I used real state 
general fund expenditures as a percentage of the given state’s gross domestic product.  Thus, 
an increase in this variable denotes an increase in state government size.   
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The final variable is fiscal health, and was constructed initially by Cummins and Holyoke 
(2011) to gauge state budget management.  Since many states are not allowed by law to run 
fiscal deficits, many will defer expenditures using advanced accounting methods.  To subvert 
these tactics, fiscal health examines the ending balance of the state’s general fund (adjusted 
for inflation) as a percentage of real state general fund expenditures.  A dummy variable is 
then employed, which is coded to record whether or not ending balances for the general fund 
are above or below 10% of general fund expenditures.  If the ending balance is below 10%, 
the variable is coded 1 for fiscal unhealthiness, and if above 10%, it is coded zero.  Many 
states have different fiscal situations and it is difficult to determine what a “healthy” end 
balance should be, so a percentage-based method is best in order to compare different states.  
Therefore, a 10% level is chosen, which allows leeway for various states with different 
volatility, size and reserve situations.   This threshold is in line with Cummins and Holyoke 
(2011), as a 5% level would seem too critical and a 15% level too lax.    
The fiscal variables for the national level seek to replicate the variable measures at the state 
level.   Revenue and expenditure growth variables are extracted from The White House Office 
of Management and Budget datasets, which record the national receipts (revenues) and 
outlays (expenditures) each year.  These are then adjusted for inflation and recorded as 
percentage changes for the length of each state representative’s term limit, mirroring the state 
fiscal policy variables.  The proxy for government size constitutes national outlays as a 
percentage of national gross domestic product, with higher percentages indicating growth in 
government size.  Finally, fiscal health is also recorded as a dummy variable, but with 
different thresholds.  Due to the tendency for the federal government to run deficits 
(especially in years within the data range), if the deficit amount is greater than 15% of 
expenditures, it will be considered fiscally unhealthy.   This indicates that fiscal health in 
years in which deficits exceed 15% of expenditures will be coded as one, while deficits under 
this threshold will be coded as zero.   
To generate efficient and robust regression estimates, I follow the literature and employ a set 
of control variables (Cummins et al., 2011; Lowry et al., 1998; Peltzman, 1992).  These 
control variables fall into four main categories: state economic and political conditions, 
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national economic and political conditions, state statutes and governor powers, and campaign-
specific conditions. 
The first set of control variables account for state economic and political conditions, which 
influence the outcomes of state elections.  As the primary indicator of economic performance 
at the state level, the average annualized State Unemployment rate for each election year is 
utilized.  Higher unemployment rates should equate to a lower share of votes for incumbent 
parties that preside over them.  Party Affiliation is utilized to capture the party allegiance of 
both legislative and gubernatorial representatives, which could have an effect on the way 
governors or legislators are treated for their fiscal policy decisions.  An interaction term to 
examine this relationship is included as well to determine whether or not politicians of 
different parties are held to different standards for fiscal policy standards.  Party affiliation is 
used in conjunction with State Citizen Ideology, which is coded on a 0 to100 spectrum, where 
a ranking of 0 indicates very conservative citizen ideology and 100 indicates very liberal 
ideology.  This variable is coded to boost the share of votes/seats that are given to 
Republicans or Democrats in office if their party ideology matches citizen ideology and 
punish them if not.   
Other state political conditions to be controlled involve specific election conditions.  For 
instance, in legislative elections, the variable Gubernatorial Election Year is a dummy 
employed to control for whether or not the election coincides with a gubernatorial election, 
which is likely to increase voter turnout.  Governor Coattail Effect is used to capture a 
phenomenon which only occurs in gubernatorial election years.  The coattails effect variable 
is used in the legislative model to control for the increased likelihood that the party of the 
winning incumbent governor will likely attain a higher percentage of the seats in the lower 
house of the legislature.  Finally, Unified Government is a variable used to indicate conditions 
where the same party controls both branches of government.  As indicated in the literature, 
voters are more likely to punish representatives that serve terms in which the same party holds 
both the legislature and the governor’s mansion.  An interaction term is also used to 
quantitatively test for this theory.   
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The second set of control variables deals with national political and economic conditions. 
National economic and political conditions are highly publicized and often have an effect on 
elections at the state level.  Federal Unemployment Rate will serve as the primary indicator of 
national economic conditions.  A higher federal unemployment rate may lead to lower vote 
shares for incumbent state elected officials that preside over them.  Presidential Election Year 
is a dummy variable designed to account for these election years and is also included for 
legislative and gubernatorial elections.  Presidential election years should improve vote shares 
for incumbent officials due to the higher voter turnout for presidential elections (Cummins 
and Holyoke 2011).  This high turnout is predicted to increase vote shares for incumbents 
because voters which only turn out for presidential election years will likely be less aware of 
challengers and less critical of current government officials (Cummins and Holyoke 2011).   
Presidential Approval based on partisanship control of the White House must also be 
considered within the model.  Presidential Approval is included because presidential approval 
ratings can strongly affect voter mindsets when entering any election.  This variable is coded 
in a way that rewards like-partied incumbent party candidates if approval is high and punishes 
them otherwise.  In contrast, Presidential Approval is coded to reward opposite-partied 
incumbents if presidential approval is low and hurt them if it is low.  Finally, National Unified 
Government is included to weigh the differences in electoral accountability when the 
president and the incumbent majority in the legislature or the governor share the same party.  
National Unified Government is a dummy variable and is coded 1 if the governor or 
legislature (depending on the model) is controlled by the same party that the president belongs 
to and 0 otherwise.  National Unified Government is expected to affect state electoral 
accountability depending on national fiscal policy decisions that voters agree with or disagree 
with.  This variable is only included in the models that measure federal fiscal policy for this 
reason.   
The third set of control variables takes into account state-specific statutes and governor 
powers.  The first variable is Governor Veto Powers, which looks at the capacity governors 
have to control policy, which can range wildly between states.  Governors with expansive 
veto powers, such as line-item veto abilities, will likely be perceived to be more responsible 
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for fiscal policy decisions than the legislature.  Additionally, governors with strong budget 
powers will also likely be deemed more responsible for fiscal policies than the legislature.  
Both of these conditions will be addressed by utilizing Beyle’s index of gubernatorial budget 
powers and veto powers, which consist of scales from 1-5, where higher values represent 
stronger powers.  The final variable is Deficity Carry-over in this set concerns states which 
allow government to carry over deficits into the following year.  Since many states don’t 
allow governments to run deficits, voters in states that do may be less critical of government 
officials when balancing the budget.  This is captured in a dummy variable, where states 
which allow deficit carry-over will be coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.    
The fourth set of control variables are campaign-specific conditions.   These conditions apply 
exclusively to gubernatorial elections and are thus only included in gubernatorial models.  
The first dummy variable, Incumbent Running, addresses the advantages that individual 
incumbent governors running for reelection have, which is expected to boost vote shares for 
the incumbent party.  This dummy variable is coded 1 if the incumbent party’s candidate is 
the actual incumbent governor and 0 otherwise.  Campaign spending by the incumbent 
governor party is recorded and included in the model, as increases in campaign spending for 
the incumbent party is expected to correlate with increased vote shares for the incumbent.  In 
contrast, Challenger Spending is included as well, which is expected to diminish vote shares 
to the incumbent governor’s party.    
A table summarizing these variables, entitled “Appendices A- Variable List and 
Descriptions”, can be found in the Appendices section.   
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
I begin my analysis with the findings from the gubernatorial model.  Appendix B reports the 
regression results for the model using state fiscal independent variables, while Appendix C 
shows the results of the model using national fiscal policy variables.  Appendices D, E, F and 
G contain the results from the interaction term models that were conducted using state fiscal 
policy variables.   In all interaction term models, the same control variables were utilized (as 
in Appendices B and C) although they are not listed in the tables.   
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In gubernatorial races, fiscal policy outcomes are found to be highly significant in 
determining the share of the vote governors receive.   State revenue growth rates and 
expenditure rates both have a positive effect on incumbent governor party vote shares and are 
significant at the 5% level.  This possibly shows that voters reward governors with more votes 
when they grow revenues and expenditures at a faster rate, which is consistent with Cummins 
and Holyoke (2011). This likely implies that voters enjoy the social benefits they receive from 
increased state expenditures, and possibly perceive revenue growth to come from taxpayers at 
a higher tax bracket or who are more heavily taxed on different activities than they are 
(cigarettes, alcohol, gasoline etc.)  Paradoxically, however, governors were punished for 
increasing the size of government.  This is evident from the negative effect government size 
had on incumbent gubernatorial vote shares, significant at the 1% level. This finding is 
consistent with literature; possibly implying that constituents reward governors for increasing 
revenues and expenditures because it leads to increased government benefits (Cummins and 
Holyoke, 2011; Lowry et al., 1998).  However, when the size of government grows 
dramatically, voters may draw conclusions that others are receiving government benefits from 
their tax contributions.   
Finally, governors not only avoided punishment for budget mismanagement, they were 
actually found to be rewarded for it. This breaks with findings from the literature (Cummins 
and Holyoke 2011), as fiscal unhealthiness was found to be very significant and increase vote 
shares for the party of the governor presiding over the mismanagement.  This is likely due to 
the same phenomenon which leads to increased vote shares for revenue and expenditure 
increases.  Constituents typically dislike austerity, and budgets that are stretched thin or 
overdrawn may indicate that tax revenue is being heavily allocated to programs that benefit 
voters in that state.   
Next, I will discuss my general model for federal fiscal variables (Appendix C), which 
indicates that all federal fiscal policy conditions were insignificant in determining vote shares 
for state governors.   Given the amount of influence that state fiscal policy had on voter 
decisions, and the amount of publicity that national fiscal conditions receive, this was an 
unexpected result.  However, upon further analysis, interaction terms for federal government 
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size and federal fiscal health in conditions of national unified government are both negative 
and significant at the 1% level and 5% level respectively (Appendix G).  This is consistent 
with Peltzman (1987), which stated that voters disliked government spending at the state and 
national levels.  This is possibly because when U.S. presidents grow the size of government or 
run deficits greater than 15% of the annual budgets, governors with the same party affiliation 
as the president are punished at the polls.  This may imply that although governors avoid most 
of the backlash of federal fiscal policy, they will suffer the wrath of voters who disapprove of 
fiscal policy decisions made by presidents of the same political party.   
To voters’ credit, this indicates that they often correctly allocate responsibility to state 
leadership, and national fiscal policy did not affect their choices in state elections.  However, 
this breaks down when the governor and president are of the same party, in which case it 
seems that voters will punish governors as a show of discontent and frustration with 
presidential fiscal policy decisions.   
The results of the remaining interaction term regressions yield interesting findings.  While 
Incumbent Running interaction term showed no specific relationship between individual 
incumbent governors and fiscal policy outcomes (Appendix D), it was found that incumbent 
Democrats were actually punished for both growths in state revenues and expenditures 
(Appendix E).  The negative and statistically significant interaction term variables of revenue 
growth and expenditure growth in conjunction with party affiliation exhibit this relationship.  
This clashes with both conventional wisdom and the literature, as Democrats run on a more 
liberal spending platform and research has observed Democrats being rewarded for revenue 
and expenditure growth (or at least punished less harshly than Republicans) (Lowry et al., 
1998; Peltzman, 1987).  This discrepancy may be due to differences in voter ideology 
between state revenue and expenditure growth and national revenue and expenditure growth.  
While Democratic voters may believe the federal government should increase revenue and 
expenditure growth, they may feel differently about state government tax and spending 
increases.   
The final interaction term model involved the reactions of voters to changes in the four main 
state fiscal policy conditions in times of unified state government (governor and legislature 
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controlled by the same party).  In conditions of unified government, fiscal health was positive 
and significant at the 5% level for the incumbent governor’s party.  This implies that 
governors are rewarded more for spending large amounts of their budgets when the state 
legislature is controlled by the same party.  This is interpreted in the same fashion as general 
gubernatorial regressions (in Appendix B);  state voters seem to reward governors for 
spending most or all of a state’s annual budget because voters attribute this to increases in 
benefits and social programs. Elections in which both houses of the state government is 
unified allows voters to concentrate this approval by voting increasingly for the incumbent 
governor’s party.   
Interestingly, state unemployment rates had less of an effect on gubernatorial vote shares than 
fiscal policy.  Although it was significant at the 10% level and had a negative effect in three 
of the four models in Appendix B, it was only significant at the 5% level in the regression 
measuring fiscal health.  Due to the direct effect that state unemployment has on voter’s lives 
and wellbeing, one would consider these variables to have a greater effect on vote shares for 
state representatives.  This reinforces findings from Peltzman (1987),  who stated that 
governors were beginning to be relinquished from accountability for conditions out of their 
control, as conditions such as income and inflation are more a product of national policy than 
state, and unemployment is more of a product of business cycles than of gubernatorial 
ineptitude.   
Another interesting finding was that in most gubernatorial models, federal unemployment was 
significant at either 5% or 10%, but oddly had a positive effect on the vote shares of 
incumbent governors.  This may be the result of voters juxtaposing their state’s economic 
conditions to the national average.  This is to say, voters may be less critical of state 
unemployment if they perceive the national unemployment situation to be much worse.  
Therefore, it can be said that conditions of high federal unemployment benefit state governors 
because state economic conditions seem better by comparison.  This further reinforces the 
trend that voters seem to distinguish between state and federal conditions, and often only 
punish state representatives for conditions within their control.    
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Additionally, it appears that the following control variables had a significant effect on vote 
shares for gubernatorial and legislative elections: presidential election year, national unified 
government, incumbent party spending and challenger party spending.  As expected, 
additional challenger and incumbent spending, which brought decreases and increases 
respectively in the percentage of the vote attributed to the incumbent governor party, and were 
significant at the 1% level.  In addition to challenger and gubernatorial spending, presidential 
election years were found to be a major boon for incumbent party governors, with a positive 
effect on incumbent party vote shares at the 5% level of significance.  This is likely due to the 
fact that presidential elections bring more low-frequency voters to the polls, and incumbents 
are rewarded for name recognition and visibility during their terms.  Finally, national unified 
government had a consistently negative effect on vote shares for the incumbent governor, 
significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that in situations where the president is the same 
party as the governor, governors receive less vote shares at election times.  This relationship 
likely exists because presidents are very highly visible and are critiqued heavily for policy 
choices; the resulting frustration with presidential actions may push voters to punish their 
state executives if they are affiliated with the same party.   
Moving on to legislative elections, the results of the model utilizing state fiscal conditions are 
displayed in Appendix H, while the results of the national fiscal variable model are shown in 
Appendix I.  Appendices J, K, and L show the results from the models using various 
interaction terms.  Worthy of note in the legislative model, a lagged dependent variable was 
included to account for the high correlation between the percentage of seats held by the 
majority party from each election period to the next.   Although this does present a bias in my 
OLS model, it is acceptable given the high amount of variance explained by the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable.  In gubernatorial elections, the lagged dependent variable is 
unnecessary because gubernatorial elections are both less frequent and more independent of 
one another.   
 In legislative elections, legislators seem to have avoided blame for all fiscal policy outcomes 
at both the national and state level in the general fiscal variable regressions (Appendix H and 
I).  While all fiscal policy variables were insignificant, state and federal unemployment were 
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insignificant for all regressions as well, indicating that state and national economic conditions 
did not affect voters’ choices for legislators.  This finding is consistent with the literature on 
legislative elections and fiscal policy, which also indicate that legislatures avoid scrutiny for 
fiscal conditions (Cummins and Holyoke, 2011; Lowry et al., 1998). However, when running 
models including various interaction terms, state and national fiscal policy were found to have 
an effect on legislative votes in certain conditions.   
Appendix J shows the relation between fiscal policy variables and legislative vote allocations 
in conditions of unified government.  The only variable affecting vote shares in this 
circumstance was revenue growth, which had a positive and significant effect on vote shares 
for the majority legislative party at conventional levels.  This implies that revenue growth in 
conditions of unified state government resulted in increased vote shares for the presiding 
majority part of the legislature.  However, this may because of voter’s recognition of the 
legislature’s fiscal actions or because they received additional votes simply as a byproduct of 
increased governor popularity over revenue increases.     
Appendix K shows the results for the model including an interaction term between national 
unified government and federal fiscal policy.  The first significant interaction term was 
federal revenue growth rate contingent on unified national government, which had a negative 
impact on vote shares for the majority legislative party and was significant at the 10% level.  
This implies that when the revenue growth rate increases at the national level, legislative 
majority parties are punished when the presiding U.S. president is of the same party.  This is 
likely due to the fact that Americans do not like tax increases, which are the only way 
government revenues are achieved.  Thus, voters seem to express discontent with federal tax 
increases by punishing state legislators of the party that controls the White House.   
Federal expenditure growth rate contingent on unified national government is the second 
significant variable in this model.  This interaction term had a positive impact on vote share 
for the majority legislative party and was significant at the 5% level.  This implies that when 
expenditures increase at the national level, legislative parties are rewarded when the president 
is of the same party.  This relationship is expected; while voters dislike tax increases, federal 
spending is seen as using revenues to give back to taxpayers in the form of social benefits and 
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programs.  Thus, while revenues are disliked by voters, they show appreciation for federal 
expenditures by allocating increased votes to legislatures that share the party of the president 
when the rate of federal expenditures increases.   
Finally, Appendix L depicts the results of the model including the interaction term showing 
the relation between the main state fiscal variables and legislative party affiliation.  Fiscal 
health contingent on party affiliation was the only significant variable, which had a negative 
impact on majority party legislative vote shares and was significant at the 5% level.  This 
implies that Democratic legislative majorities are punished by the electorate when they 
preside over near-deficit budget scenarios.  Although conventional wisdom dictates that 
Democrats are more lavish spenders than Republicans, this suggests that voters are more 
critical of Democratic legislatures that spend increasingly without increasing tax rates to 
compensate.  This finding again clashes with the literature, which has found that Democrats 
are rewarded for government spending (Lowry et al., 1998).   
Concerning control variables, legislative elections were affected by unified government, state 
ideology, presidential approval and deficit carry-over laws.  In cases of unified government, 
incumbent majority parties in the legislature benefited from increased vote shares, likely due 
to the benefits of association with a governor rewarded for revenue and expenditure growth.  
Additionally, state ideology was a major boon for legislators, as logically legislators in the 
majority whose party affiliation matched the prevailing state ideology were rewarded with 
additional seats.  Presidential approval works in contrast to conventional wisdom, as increases 
in approval ratings negatively impacts vote shares for incumbent majority parties in 
legislatures.  Finally, deficit carry-over allowance, instead of granting reprieves to legislators 
for fiscal policy, is found to have a negative effect on state legislators.   
In summary, I find that legislators are only affected by national fiscal policy conditions when 
the president is the same party as the majority party.  Certain state fiscal conditions are also 
only significant in circumstances where unified government exists or majority legislative 
party affiliation comes into play. Governors however, are affected by all state fiscal policy 
variables and are punished under national unified government for federal fiscal deficits and 
government size.  This is consistent with previous findings, which indicate that governors 
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bear the brunt of voter sentiment due to increased voter recognition, perceived independence,  
and visibility, whether it be negative or positive (Lowry et al., 1998; Peltzman, 1992).   
CONCLUSIONS 
From these results, answers to the initial research questions can be determined.  The question 
concerning the significance of state fiscal policy and national fiscal policy on elections for 
state officials has a very clear answer; state fiscal policy matters while national fiscal policy 
does not.  More resoundingly, it seems that state fiscal policy decisions are more influential in 
voter decisions than even state (and certainly federal) unemployment rates.  This contrasts 
with the expectation for legislative elections to be affected heavily by national conditions.  It 
seems that voters have continued the trend of sensible accountability allocation for conditions 
outside of their control, such as national fiscal policy and unemployment rates.   It also seems 
that the governor is accountable for state fiscal conditions far more severely than legislators, 
who seem to shirk responsibility for state and national economic and fiscal conditions.   
Lastly, it seems that party ideology and unified government play a role in voter perception of 
electoral accountability, while individual incumbent status does not.  Contrary to conventional 
wisdom (and expected results), Democratic governors were actually found to be punished for 
large increases in revenues and expenditures.  Unified government, rather than helping voters 
concentrate punishment, assisted them in rewarding legislators, proving to increase vote 
shares in all eight legislative models.  Additionally, in conditions of unified government, 
legislators were rewarded for fiscal policy when presiding over revenue increases.  However, 
it appears that individual incumbents running for reelection were judged the same as upstart 
governors at the ballot box, with incumbents receiving no enhanced scrutiny or praise.  This 
points towards more governor definition by party ideology rather than a concentration on the 
individual, a trend that is running counter to presidential elections at the national level.  While 
a focus on ideology rather than character may be beneficial for incumbent governors, it 
certainly doesn’t help responsible fiscal management for state constituents, who should 
punish experienced incumbents for budget mismanagement and rapid government growth.   
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Where my study diverges from literature is when examining federal fiscal outcomes 
conditional on national unified government.  In situations of nationally unified government, it 
is found that many fiscal policy decisions at the state level are significant in state elections.  It 
seems that voters will exhibit their frustrations or contentedness with the president’s national 
fiscal policy by rewarding or punishing incumbent governors and legislators of the same 
party.  This is very interesting, as national unified government has a greater effect on federal 
fiscal policy significance than unified government had on state fiscal policy significance.  
Therefore, although typically federal fiscal policy does not matter to voters when choosing 
state representatives, when national unified government exists, federal fiscal policy has a 
greater effect in gubernatorial elections.   
To enhance this research further, additional variables and research methods could be utilized.  
An influential factor in state elections is state interest group activity.  As lobbying increases at 
the federal and state level, a variable controlling for this phenomenon would help explain 
further variance in gubernatorial and legislative elections.  Additionally, analysis of national 
unified government in terms of United States Congressional control could yield further 
findings about how state voters view federal fiscal policy in state elections.  Finally, research 
analyzing the time range of this data in separate decade-long segments would prove 
beneficial.  This would allow for trend analysis over time, which in turn would capture 
changes in voter perceptions of state electoral accountability.   This type of trend analysis 
would be especially fruitful when assessing state elections, as state government power and 
size have grown considerably over the past three decades.   
There are three large and important implications derived from this research.  First, in times 
without national unified government, national fiscal and economic conditions seem to be 
completely uninfluential in the realm of state elections.  This is a strong benefit for both 
constituents and public officials.  It allows governors and legislators to govern without fear of 
blame from fiscal and economic scenarios outside of their command and also indicates that 
citizens recognize state officials’ sphere of control.  This shows that voters are understand 
how to discern between conditions that state representatives have control over, and those that 
they do not.  Building upon this, these informed voters then only punish governors and 
Who Cares About the Budget? 
Senior Capstone Project by Alexander Scelzo 
- 24 - 
legislatures who perform poorly in areas that they do indeed have control over.  This bodes 
well for gubernatorial and legislative elections at the state level, as an informed populace will 
likely make better electoral choices.  Apparently, the largely publicized national fiscal and 
economic variables do not have a substantial impact on voters’ views of state officials.     
Second, citizens reward state fiscal policy choices in a way that defies conventional wisdom 
and sometimes, itself.  This is evident in the rewarding of governors who mismanage budgets 
while raising revenues and expenditures, while punishing those who increase government 
size.  This shows that while Americans dislike fiscal irresponsibility, they dislike the loss of 
government benefits and programs more.  Additionally, it shows that citizens want the 
government to grow, but not too fast.  Too much of an increase in government size incites 
voter scorn about waste (a combination of inefficiency and benefits that they don’t receive).  
This is a dangerous prospect for fiscal sustainability in the United States.  If governors are 
consistently rewarded for revenue and expenditure increases as well as for deficit-running 
budget habits, they are more likely to engage in those activities.  These policies are 
unsustainable, as states without surpluses will never have necessary savings for long-term 
programs and will eventually run into solvency issues.   
Finally, I provide clear evidence that voters have a different opinion about federal fiscal 
policy than they do about state fiscal policy.  For instance, governors are rewarded on average 
for increasing revenues, expenditures and running deficits at the state level.  However, under 
conditions of unified national government, state legislatures are punished for federal revenue 
growth rate increases and governors are punished for excessive federal deficits.  Therefore, 
while it seems that state voters promote revenue growth and near-deficit spending at the state 
level, they don’t approve of the same fiscal policy choices in the national sphere.  This is 
likely due to the notion that constituents want the government to keep and expand their 
benefits, but don’t like the idea of a government that expands benefits for anyone else.  Thus, 
it is likely that voters believe irresponsible state fiscal policy will lead to more direct benefits 
than irresponsible national fiscal policy.   
If this is true, it would seem that voters have not been punishing presidents as much as they 
are state representatives that share his party.  An interesting area of further research would be 
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to examine whether presidents were punished alongside their state representative party-mates 
in conditions of national unified government, or if voters took out their entire electoral wrath 
on state representatives.  The latter seems to be the case and, at least for most voters, love of 
programs and benefits trump desire for prudence, which has led to perpetual budget deficits 
and skyrocketing national debt.  As a nation who rewards irresponsible fiscal governance, 
national officials will be unlikely to campaign on turning off the spending faucet.  Those who 
do seek to reverse the trend will face serious electoral headwinds.  If the state fiscal policy 
mentality stretches to the national stage, it would predicate strong solvency concerns for the 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A – Variable List and Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Incumbent Majority Party 
Seats Wonb 
Percentage of vote won by incumbent governor party. 
Incumbent Party’s Share of 
the Votec 
Percentage of seats won by incumbent majority party in lower 
house.   
Revenue Growth Ratea Change in real general fund revenues from previous election for 
governor or legislature. 
Expenditure Growth Ratea Change in real general fund expenditures from previous election 
for governor or legislature.   
Government Sizea State general fund expenditures divided by state gross domestic 
product. 
Fiscal Healtha Dummy variable:  Coded 1 if total year-end general fund balance 
is less than 10%, 0 otherwise.   
Federal Revenue Growth 
Rateg 
Change in federal government total receipts (revenues) from 
previous election for governor or legislature. 
Federal Expenditure Growth 
Rateg 
Change in federal government total outlays (expenditures) from 
previous election for governor or legislature. 
Federal Government Sizeg Federal total outlays divided by U.S. gross domestic product.   
Federal Fiscal Healthg Dummy variable:  Coded 1 if total U.S. annual deficit is greater 
than 15% of federal total outlays, 0 otherwise. 
Unified Governmentbc Dummy variable:  Coded 1 if the governor and state legislature 
are of the same party.   
State Unemployment Ratef State unemployment rate during current election year for 
governor or legislature.   
National Unified 
Governmentbci 
Dummy variable:  Coded 1 ifu the president and either the state 
legislature or governor are of the same party.   
State Ideologyd Spectrum measure of state citizen ideology:  0 indicates 
conservative views and 100 indicates liberal views.   
Incumbent Gubernatorial 
Partyc 
Dummy variable:  1 if incumbent governor is Democrat, 0 if 
Republican 
Incumbent Majority Partyc Dummy variable:  1 if incumbent majority party in the legislature 
is Democrat, 0 if Republican.   
Federal Unemployment Rateh Federal unemployment rate during current election year for 
governor or legislature.   
Presidential Election Yeari Dummy variable:  Coded 1 during presidential election years, 0 
otherwise.    
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a Acquired from  National Association of State Budget Officers, (Various Years). Fiscal survey of the states 
National Association of State Budget Officers. 
b Acquired from Klarner, C. (2003). State legislative election returns data. In C. Klarner (Ed.), Klarner Politics. 
Indiana State University. 
c Acquired from Jensen, Jennifer M. and Thad Beyle. 2003. "Of Footnotes, Missing Data, and Lessons for 50-
State Data Collection: The Gubernatorial Campaign Finance Project, 1977-2001." State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly 3:203-214. 
d Acquired from Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording and Russell L. Hanson. 1998.  
“Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93.” American Journal of Political 
Science 42:327-48.   
e  Acquired from National Conference of State Legislatures, (2010). Ncsl fiscal brief: state balanced budget 
provisions. National Conference of State Legislatures.   
f  Acquired from Bureau of Economic Analysis, (2014).  GDP and Personal Income. U.S. Commerce 
Department.   
g Acquired from The White House Office of Management and Budget, (2014).  Historical Tables.  Summary of 
Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits.  The White House Office of Management and Budget.   
h Acquired from The Bureau of Labor Statistics, (2014).  Labor force statistics from the current population 
survey.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
i Acquired from  Wooley, John and Peters, Gerhard (2014).  Presidential Job Approval. The American 
Presidency Project.   
j Acquired from Beyle, (2001).  Veto Power.  Gubernatorial Power. 
k Acquired from Beyle, (2001).  Budget Power.  Gubernatorial Power.   
Gubernatorial Election Yearc Dummy variable:  Coded 1 during gubernatorial election years, 0 
otherwise.   
Presidential Approvali Presidential approval rating in October or November before 
presidential election.    
Governor Veto Powerj Spectrum measure of governor veto powers:  1 indicates weak 
governor veto powers and 5 indicates strong governor veto 
powers.   
Governor Budget Powerk Spectrum measure of governor budget powers:  1 indicates weak 
governor budget powers and 5 indicates strong governor veto 
powers.   
Deficit Carryover Allowede Dummy variable:  Coded 1 if state deficit can be carried over into 
the next fiscal year.   
Incumbent Campaign 
Spendingc 
Logged dollar amount spent by incumbent gubernatorial party 




Logged dollar amount spent by challenging gubernatorial party 
candidate in primary and general election (in 2005 dollars and 
thousands).   
Incumbent Runningc Dummy variable:  Coded 1 if incumbent governor is running for 
reelection.   
Gov. Coattails Effectbc Dummy variable:  Coded 1 if winning gubernatorial party is same 
as majority party in lower chamber going into election.   
Lagged Dependent 
Variablec 
Percentage of seats won by incumbent majority party in lower 
house lagged by one election period.   
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Appendix B- OLS Regression Estimates: Gubernatorial Elections - State Fiscal Conditions 
Notes:  T statistics are in parentheses, *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
 











Government Size - - -.735*** 
(-2.83) 
 
Fiscal Health - - - .029*** 
(2.55) 




























































































































Adjusted R2 .4592 .4581 .4509 .4486 
Observations 321 321 369 369 
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Appendix B- OLS Regression Estimates: Gubernatorial Elections – Federal Fiscal Conditions 
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Adjusted R2 .4503 .4494 .4533 .4493 
Observations 369 369 369 369 
Notes:  T statistics are in parentheses, *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix D: OLS Regression Estimates: Gubernatorial Elections – Incumbent Interaction 
Term 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Revenue Growth Rate 
X Incumbent Running 
-.0123 
(-.24) 
- - - 
Expenditure Growth Rate 





X Incumbent Running 




X Incumbent Running 
- - - .0275 
(1.18) 
Adjusted R2 .4575 .4566 .4494 .4492 
     
Observations 321 321 369 369 
     




Appendix E: OLS Regression Estimates: Gubernatorial Elections – Party Interaction Term 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Revenue Growth Rate 
X Party Ideology 
-.0854* 
(-1.67) 
- - - 
Expenditure Growth Rate 





X Party Ideology 




X Party Ideology 
- - - .0202 
(.89) 
Adjusted R2 .4623 .4625 .4495 .4483 
     
Observations 321 321 369 369 
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Appendix F: OLS Regression Estimates: Gubernatorial Elections – Unified Government 
Interaction Term 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Revenue Growth Rate 
X Unified Government 
.0058 
(.11) 
- - - 
Expenditure Growth Rate 





X Unified Government 




X Unified Government 
- - - .044** 
(1.98) 
Adjusted R2 .4574 .4564 .4494 .4483 
     
Observations 321 321 369 369 
     




Appendix G: OLS Regression Estimates: Gubernatorial Elections – National Unified 
Government  
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Federal Rev. Growth Rate 




- - - 
Federal Exp. Growth Rate 





Federal Government Size 
X National Unified 
Government 
- - -1.267*** 
(-2.61) 
- 
Federal Fiscal Health 
X National Unified 
Government 
- - - -.0389** 
(-2.07) 
Adjusted R2 .4503 .4482 .4495 .4545 
     
Observations 321 321 369 369 
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Appendix H: OLS Regression Estimates: Legislative Elections - State Fiscal Conditions 
Notes:  T statistics are in parentheses, *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
 











Government Size - - .0538 
(.31) 
 
Fiscal Health - - - -.0023 
(-.31) 






























































































































Adjusted R2 .6838 .6827 .6828 .6828 
Observations 559 559 559 559 
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Appendix I: OLS Regression Estimates: Legislative Elections - Federal Fiscal Conditions 
Notes:  T statistics are in parentheses, *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 











Government Size - - .126 
(.36) 
 
Fiscal Health - - - .0051 
(.65) 








































































































































Adjusted R2 .6836 .6842 .6836 .6838 
Observations 572 572 572 572 
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Appendix J: OLS Regression Estimates: Legislative Elections – Unified Government 
Interaction Term 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Revenue Growth Rate 
X Unified Government 
.0549* 
(1.67) 
- - - 
Expenditure Growth 
Rate 





X Unified Government 




X Unified Government 
- - - -.0070 
(-.48) 
Adjusted R2 .6848 .6835 .6822 .6823 
     
Observations 559 559 559 559 
     
Notes:  T statistics are in parentheses, *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
 
Appendix K: OLS Regression Estimates: Legislative Elections – National Unified 
Government Interaction Term 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Federal Rev. Growth Rate 




- - - 
Federal Exp. Growth Rate 





Federal Government Size 
X National Unified 
Government 
- - -.0472 
(-.15) 
- 
Federal Fiscal Health 
X National Unified 
Government 
- - - .0022 
(.18) 
Adjusted R2 .6848 .6861 .6831 .6832 
     
Observations 572 572 572 572 
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Appendix L: OLS Regression Estimates: Legislative Elections – Party Affiliation Interaction 
Term 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Revenue Growth Rate 
X Party Affiliation 
.001 
(.03) 
- - - 
Expenditure Growth 
Rate 





X Unified Government 




X Unified Government 
- - - -.034** 
(-2.27) 
Adjusted R2 .6832 .6827 .6823 .6852 
     
Observations 559 559 559 559 
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